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LIBERAL THEORY AND THE NEED 
FOR POLITICS 
Steven Shijfrin * 
LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD. Edited by R. Bruce Douglass, Gerald 
M. Mara, and Henry S. Richardson. New York: Routledge. 1990. 
Pp. viii, 289. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $15.95. 
A common misperception about the conflict between liberalism 
and conservatism is that liberals characteristically advocate state neu-
trality about the good life while conservatives believe the state should 
promote character and virtue. For example, in an influential essay, 
Ronald Dworkin claimed that the core belief of liberalism is that the 
state should maintain "official neutrality amongst theories of what is 
valuable in life."1 He not only made the normative claim that this 
core belief is part of the best political theory, but also asserted that it 
described the beliefs of then contemporary American liberal politi-
cians2 from Hubert Humphrey3 to George McGovem.4 
But it is simply false as a matter of intellectual history and as a 
description of contemporary liberal politics to suppose that liberalism 
generally exhibits a commitment to official neutrality about the char-
acter of the good life. To be sure, conservative and liberal political 
theories invariably conclude that the state should take a posture of 
neutrality about many issues. But liberal democrats have routinely 
• Professor of Law, Cornell University. B.A. 1963, Loyola, L.A.; M.A. 1964, Cal. State, 
Northridge; J.D. 1975, Loyola, L.A. - Ed. I want to thank Kathryn Abrams, Gregory Alexan-
der, Cynthia Farina, Valita Fredland, Gerald Lopez,' Seana Shiffrin, and Susan Williams for 
providing valuable comments on a prior draft of this review. 
1. Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 142 (S. Hampshire ed. 
1978), reprinted in R. DWORKIN, A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE 181, 203 (1985); accord B. ACKER-
MAN, SOCIAL JusncE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11, 57-58, 166 n.10 (1980); J. RAWLS, A THEORY 
OF JusncE § 67, at 442 & § 50, at 325-32 (1971) (after principles of justice are in place, govern-
ment must "avoid any assessment of the relative value of one another's way of life"); id. §§ 60-
68, at 395-452 (in original position, decisionmakers have no particular conception of the good, 
but think a rational plan of life is important). 
Dworkin's position on the issue has shifted over the years. See Shiffrin, Rights v. Goals, N.Y. 
Times, June 9, 1985, § 7 (Book Review), at 24, col. 4 (reviewing R. DWORKIN, supra). John 
Rawls' thinking in this area has also evolved. Compare J .. RAWLS, supra, with Rawls, The Prior-
ity of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 251 (1988). 
2. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 121, 128. 
3. Id. at 118. 
4. Id. at 115. 
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departed from neutrality. John Stuart Mill5 and John Dewey6 specifi-
cally argued, for example, that it was an important part of govern-
ment's role to support the development of a particular kind of person. 
Moreover, many liberals have supported museums and libraries, for 
example, precisely on the ground that such subsidies would support 
the good life. Indeed, a key difference between liberals and conserva-
tives concerns the question of what type of citizen the state should en-
courage rather than whether the state should encourage a particular 
type of citizen or not. 7 
Ten of the eleven essays collected in Liberalism and the Good and 
edited by R. Bruce Douglass,8 Gerald M. Mara,9 and Henry Richard-
son 10 proceed from the assumption that the state need not be neutral 
about the good life, and they pose a variety of alternatives to the ques-
tion: what follows from nonneutrality? In addition to the editors, 11 
the contributors of those essays include a diverse group of thoughtful 
commentators: Brian Barry,12 William Connolly,13 Amy Gutmann,14 
John Langan,15 Martha C. Nussbaum,16 Stephen G. Salkever,17 Ken-
neth Schmitz,18 William M. Sullivan,19 and Dennis Thompson.20 
Bruce Ackerman is the lone representative of the view that the 
state should be neutral about the good life, and he devotes little space 
in his otherwise stimulating essay21 to defending that premise.22 But 
5. See J. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF PoLmCAL EcONOMY bk. v, ch. XI,§ 1, at 941-42; § 8, at 
953-56; § 15, at 975-77 (W. Ashley ed. 1809) (7th ed. 1871). 
6. J. DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 30-31 (1935). 
7. See generally Shilfrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 
1103 (1983); West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. 
PrIT. L. REV. 673 (1985). 
8. Douglass is Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown 
University. 
9. Mara is Associate Dean for Research in the Graduate School and Professorial Lecturer in 
the Department of Government at Georgetown University. 
10. Richardson is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Georgetown 
University. 
11. Richardson, The Problem of Liberalism and the Good, p. 1; Douglass & Mara, The 
Search for a Defensible Good: The Emerging Dilemma of Liberalism, p. 253. The latter essay 
provides an overall analysis of the contributions to the book with much penetrating criticism. 
12. Barry, How Not to Defend Liberal Institutions, p. 44. 
13. Connolly, Identity and Difference in Liberalism, p. 59. 
14. Gutmann & Thompson, Moral Conflict and Political Consensus, p. 125. 
15. Langan, Cotholicism and Liberalism - 200 Years of Contest and Consensus, p. 105. 
16. Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, p. 203. 
17. Salkever, ''Lopp'd and Bound'~· How Liberal Theory Obscures the Goods of Liberal Prac-
tices, p. 167. 
18. Schmitz, Is Liberalism Good Enough?, p. 86. 
19. Sullivan, Bringing the Good Back In, p. 148. 
20. See supra note 14. 
21. Ackerman, Neutralities, p. 29. 
22. He has sought to defend the premise elsewhere. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 355-
78; Ackerman, Why Dialogue, 86 J. PHIL. 5 (1989). 
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at one point, he lashes out at a nonneutral form of liberalism, sug-
gesting that a departure from neutrality would involve the state in 
making "all sorts of intolerant public pronouncements about the na-
ture of 'human flourishing' " (p. 39). This brief argument invokes a 
standard range of liberal fears - from the ugliness of prejudice to the 
brutality of a state that limits freedom. But fears of this sort do not 
haunt the rest of the essays in this book. The contributors - all to the 
left of the American political spectrum's center23 - believe a progres-
sive form of politics may be maintained without resort to state 
neutrality. 
Of course, everyone believes that the state should be neutral about 
some things. In my view, however, the quest for official neutrality 
about the good life is one of political theory's best examples of a dead 
end.24 Worse, it has diverted scholars from asking questions that are 
approached but not addressed in this book. I propose, however, to 
sneak up on those questions by considering some of the themes that 
run through the essays: first, the objections raised by the contributors 
to liberal neutrality, and second, the postneutral alternatives posed by 
the commentators. In the end, I will fault most of the contributors for 
their conception of the relation of theory to practice. The essays are 
very much worth reading, but the book is representative of a dominant 
perversion of political theory, one that gives us "political theory" 
without politics. 25 
I. AGAINST LIBERAL NEUTRALITY 
To claim that government should be neutral about the good is not 
to claim that government should be neutral about everything. The 
case for liberal neutrality draws on a distinction between the right and 
the good: the state, say proponents of liberal neutrality, should be 
neutral with respect to competing conceptions of the good, though not 
with respect to the right. Thus liberal neutrality supposes that individ-
uals are free to pursue their conception of the good without govern-
mental interference, but liberal neutrality also maintains that no 
person should be free to pursue a lifestyle that infringes on the rights of 
others. 
Certainly some such distinction is necessary to make the argument 
for liberal neutrality even plausible. Government cannot, for example, 
be asked to tolerate the lifestyle of the murderer. Many of the objec-
tions to liberal neutrality center on the difficulty of determining what 
"rights" are (and adjudicating between rights when they come into 
23. I draw this conclusion from the evidence of the essays and in most cases nothing else. 
From that evidence, many of them are not far from the center, and most of the authors are 
liberals, not radicals. 
24. See Sbiffrin, supra note 7, at 1134-74. 
25. See generally B. BARBER, THE CoNQUESf OF PoLmcs 3-21 (1988). 
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conflict) without resorting to some particular conception of the good. 
Similarly, the possibility of defending systems of property or philoso-
phies of education while adhering to the principle of neutrality has 
been called into serious question.26 In short, these objections support 
the conclusion that the neutrality principle, if conscientiously adhered 
to, would leave government unable to address appropriately the most 
fundamental institutional issues. 
The essays in Liberalism and the Good do not rehash these now 
commonplace criticisms. Indeed some of the essays lead into fascinat-
ing territory. Henry Richardson, for example, objects that a polity 
adhering to liberal neutrality would experience a "drastic narrowing of 
the public debate" because liberal neutrality would unfairly require 
citizens to "check their deepest convictions at the door" (p. 18). One 
could reply to Richardson, however, that American liberals of all 
stripes to a greater or lesser extent ask citizens to "check their deepest 
convictions at the door." Citizens are discouraged by the Constitution 
from suggesting that the state should promote good Catholics, 
Presbyterians, or Jews.27 Most liberals are deeply troubled by a polit-
ical argument that the Pope or the Bible "says so." Liberals charac-
teristically support a high wall between church and state. But what I 
find particularly interesting about Richardson's objection is that it 
highlights the tightrope nonneutral liberals routinely walk. That is, 
they encourage political arguments about the good life at the same 
time they seek to delegitimate religious arguments in political life. 
Reflection on another essayist's objections against liberal neutrality 
further exposes the thin character of the distinction between legitimate 
talk of the good life and illegitimate political uses of religious argu-
ments. In order to run a government, it is necessary to determine 
what minerals, plants, and animals can be put to human use, but to 
answer these questions, as Martha Nussbaum explains, forces us be-
yond neutrality about the good: 
[D]ecisions about how and whether plants, minerals, and animals are to 
be taken for use require a conception of good human functioning in rela-
26. See v. HAKSAR, EQUALITY, LIBERTY, AND PERFECTIONISM (1979); Shiffrin, supra note 
7, at 1134-74; see also J. RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM chs. 5, 6 (1986); Galston, Defend· 
ing Liberalism, 76 AM. PoL. SCI. L. REv. 621 (1982). In his contribution to the collection, 
Ackerman emphasizes that the neutrality principle is a conversational constraint rather than a 
method of evaluating consequences (pp. 38-40), but he does not try to demonstrate in this partic-
u1ar essay that power struggles can regularly be resolved without preferring one conception of 
the good life over another. His main ambition in Neutralities is to analyze the "building blocks of 
power'' (p. 30) and to show that certain criticisms of the neutrality principle rest on a misinter-
pretation of the concept. In that connection Ackerman suggests that it may have been a mistnke 
to use the word neutrality because it has led to confusion. See also Rawls, supra note 1, at 260 
(stating that the term "neutrality" is unfortunate and observing that he avoided it in A Theory of 
Justice). 
27. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I. Of course, they are not prohibited from doing so, but people are 
chilled from advancing proposals when the chances of success are small, and amending the Con-
stitution is a formidable task. 
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tion to other species and to the world of nature. In short: to answer any 
of the interesting, actual political questions about resources and their 
allocation through programs and institutions, we need to take some 
stand, and do all the time take a stand, on the Aristotelian question, 
"What human functions are important? What does a good human life 
require?"28 
It requires this much and more. To take a stand on the relation of 
human beings to animals and nature is to entertain a fundamental 
question which itself may be religious: what is the place of humanity 
in nature or in the universe? For that matter, to ask what is the good 
in life is to ask about the meaning of life. And whether or not that is a 
religious question, many millions are inclined to provide a religious 
answer. 
Nonneutral liberals therefore must explain why the good should be 
admissible in political life in a way that the religious is not. Kenneth 
Schmitz maintains that the ''political separation [of church and state] 
was preceded by the epistemological eviction of religion from 'intellec-
tually respectable' conversation. Reduced to mere opinion or belief, it 
was to be left wherever other private things are kept" (p. 92). Brian 
Barry puts it more delicately, but his point is perhaps even more bra-
zen. He maintains that a liberal outlook includes the ''belief that no 
religious dogma can reasonably be held with certainty" (p. 45). Read 
in context, this is neither a claim that beliefs in general cannot be held 
with certainty, nor a claim resting on a distinction between religious 
beliefs and religious dognia. Rather Barry is asserting that a part of 
the "liberal outlook" is that religion is specially dubious. 
No doubt, many liberals find religious beliefs to be dubious. But 
Barry's position expels too many liberals from liberalism - whether 
"liberal" means philosophical liberal or political liberal. Consider the 
role of religion, for example, in the philosophy of liberals such as John 
Locke,29 Martin Luther King, Jesse Jackson, George McGovern, or 
Mario Cuomo. 
Nonneutral liberals do not routinely rely upon skepticism about, or 
hostility toward, religion to justify distinguishing the place of the good 
from the place of religion in public life. Rather, a recurring contention 
over the years has been that a polity divided along religious lines 
would be too divisive to maintain stability. The irony of this position 
is palpable. Liberals ordinarily are the first to be associated with our 
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."30 It now ap-
28. P. 212 (footnote omitted). See also the essays in the collection by Schmitz (pp. 92, 99) 
and Sullivan (pp. 170-71). See generally K. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CoNVICTIONS AND 
PoLmCAL CHOICE 98-114 (1988); Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 1136-40. 
29. See, e.g., A. RYAN, PROPERTY AND PoLmCAL THEORY 14-48 (1984); c. TAYLOR, 
SOURCES OF THE SELF 234-47 (1989). 
30. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
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pears, however, that our commitment is that debate on public issues be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, but not too uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open. 
Of course, the divisiveness argument may be right. Moreover, if 
religious argument were a more vital part of political dialogue, religion 
might be the long run loser. Nonetheless, to discourage the discussion 
of religion in political life has its costs. It tends to undercut the impor-
tance of morality and of humane values in public life. Indeed, some 
writers have written of the liberal polity as the "naked public 
square."31 If the exclusion of religion from public life even colorably 
implicates a "naked public square," a public life in which debate about 
the good life were no part of political dialogue threatens to be utterly 
barren and shriveled. 
If liberal neutrality's implications for political dialogue are unat-
tractive, they are also at odds with our intuitions as to how conflict is 
ordinarily resolved. As Henry Richardson observes: 
When a single person's values conflict with each other, it makes little 
sense to suggest that she come to terms with this conflict by bracketing, 
or excluding from her internal dialogue, the claims of the contending 
values. Instead, she must try to come to some sort of reflective resolu-
tion, taking everything into account. The model of first-personal polit-
ical judgment carries this sort of idea, which contrasts sharply with 
neutrality, to the level of society. [p. 21] 
To put it another way, instead of neutrality, why is it not appropriate 
to balance and accommodate values? 
One of the most recent attempts to justify a regime in which one 
conception of the good is not preferred over another has been to char-
acterize such a regime as proceeding from premises shared within the 
culture32 or as "implicit or latent in the public culture."33 Thus the 
goal as characterized by John Rawls is not "a conception of justice 
that is true, but one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing 
political agreement between citizens viewed as free and equal per-
sons. "34 In a sense Rawls is now relying on a hermeneutic justifica-
tion, one that is claimed to rise out of an interpretation of the deepest 
31. R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (1984). Although the criticism is most 
often advanced by conservatives, sophisticated defenses of the view that religion must play a 
prominent role in political life have been put forth by scholars who are left of the political spec-
trum's center. See R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, w. SULLIVAN, A. SWJDLER & s. TIPTON, HABITS 
OF THE HEART (1985); K. GREENAWALT, supra note 28; M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, 
AND LAW (1988). For criticism of the notion that religious views should piny a role in judicial 
decisionmaking, see Fallon, Of Unspeakable Ethics and Constitutional Law: A Review Essay, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1523, 1544-52 (1989) (reviewing M. PERRY, supra). 
32. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 223, 
229 (1985). 
33. Id. at 231 n.14; see also Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (1987). 
34. Rawls, supra note 32, at 230. 
May 1991] Liberal Theory and Politics 1287 
intuitions of the culture. With respect, however, I regard this as a 
form of "forced hermeneutics," one that dips into the culture momen-
tarily to seize on general abstractions of freedom and equality only to 
leap even further up the ladder of abstraction to the veil of ignorance. 
Moreover, by moving toward an interpretive justification, this form of 
liberalism exposes itself to critiques that have long been applied to in-
terpretive methodologies from the genealogists to the deconstruction-
ists. As William Connolly puts it: "By saving his theory from one set 
of criticisms Rawls opens it to another set of debates."35 
Finally, Bruce Ackerman argues that a nonneutral regime will by 
definition make "all sorts of intolerant public pronouncements about 
the nature of 'human flourishing' " (p. 39). I suppose it would declare 
that poetry is better than pushpin. Why is that so bad? Of course, the 
fear is that the state will do more than make declarations about human 
flourishing, but will interfere with liberty where it has no business. To 
that Brian Barry suggests "those with a liberal outlook [should] go on 
the offensive and promote liberalism actively .... [G]iven the choice 
between trying to persuade nonliberals to accept the principle of neu-
trality and trying to discredit their beliefs, I think the second is clearly 
the better option" (pp. 56-57). Barry concedes that we may be headed 
for a "new Dark Age" (p. 57), but argues that liberals have a better 
chance of discrediting the beliefs of nonliberals than of persuading 
them to hook their star on the chariot of liberal neutrality. 
II. ALTERNATIVES TO LIBERAL NEUTRALITY 
Liberals and conservatives generally exhibit different priorities in 
their attempts to promote particular aspects of a good life. Contrast, 
for example, the Tory emphasis of George Will with the liberal accent 
of John Stuart Mill. In Statecraft As Sou/craft, Will states, "Proper 
conservatism holds that men and women are biological facts, but that 
ladies and gentlemen fit for self-government are social artifacts, cre-
ations of the law."36 But consider Isaiah Berlin's description of the 
ideals of John Stuart Mill: 
[W]hat he came to value most was neither rationality nor contentment, 
but diversity, versatility, fullness of life - the unaccountable leap of in-
dividual genius, the spontaneity and uniqueness of a man, a group, a 
civilization. . . . [H]e set himself against the worship of order or tidiness, 
or even peace, if they were bought at the price of obliterating the variety 
and colour of untamed human beings with unextinguished passions and 
untrammelled imaginations. 37 
Although Mill is infrequently cited in Liberalism and the Good, his 
35. P. 66; see also Sullivan's criticisms. P. 152 (exposes liberalism to the problems associated 
with philosophical relativism). 
36. G. WILL, STATECRAFf AS SOULCRAFf 90-91 (1983) (emphasis added). 
37. I. BERLIN, FOUR EssAYS ON LIBERTY 176-77 (1969). 
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spirit is echoed in many of its contributions. Thus Barry observes, 
"[T]he spirit of critical thinking and the practice of autonomous deci-
sion-making favored by the liberal outlook can be fostered by positive 
state action" (p. 46). Just as Barry invokes a "critical inquiring spirit" 
(p. 46), so Stephen Salkever maintains that "[t]his liberal conception 
of the good life is ... inseparable from a kind of ironic stance toward 
oneself, an unwillingness to take any one of my present beliefs or com-
mitments too seridusly" (p. 188). Moreover, Salkever highlights the 
role liberal institutions, particularly courts and the universities, have 
played in fostering the habits of mind associated with the Socratic, 
critical, self-examining, ongoing dialogue encouraged by liberalism. 
Liberal theorists, he argues, have failed to appreciate that the support 
of particular human virtues is compatible with the "core of liberal the-
ory" (p. 168). 
Whether purporting to speak for or against liberalism, the contrib-
utors frequently observe the extent to which human beings are socially 
constituted. Salkever "calls attention to the way in which institutions 
and practices help shape preferences and characters" (p. 176). 
Schmitz notes that, "in the end and from the beginning, our individu-
ality is situated in what is neither wholly mine nor wholly yours, but 
ours'' (p. 98). And Langan points to humans as "social beings" pos-
sessing rights not as "creatures ... in a pre-social state of nature but as 
an aspect of their shared life in a social and political community which 
is necessary for their fulfillment" (p. 111). 
Recognition of our social embeddedness as humans, however, 
bears no necessary connection to communitarianism. William Con-
nolly, for example, is fully aware of the extent to which social and 
political institutions structure our identity, but he argues for a mili-
tantly individualistic assault on these institutions. For him, the "good 
life is one in which creative tension is generated between the claims of 
individuality and commonality" (p. 82). 
In a different way, Martha Nussbaum moves from an appreciation 
of the culturally induced character of preferences to advocating a 
political system which would guarantee each individual a meaningful 
opportunity to lead a flourishing life. She believes that it is possible to 
offer a much thicker conception of the good than has been advanced 
by Rawlsian liberals, and she admirably succeeds in that venture. In-
deed, many Rawlsians may find her analysis to be a helpful articula-
tion of goods that all humans share. Moreover, she effectively 
criticizes the liberal preoccupation with material resource distribution. 
Ultimately, Nussbaum's conception of the good becomes more 
than many liberals would care to swallow in political practice. Indeed, 
her approach might be called a form of radical Aristotelianism - rad-
ical, for example, in that the good life for Nussbaum does not merely 
consist of sufficient money and commodities, as well as protected liber-
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ties, but it also requires freedom from forms of labor that are "monot-
onous and mindless, and demanding in their time requirements" (p. 
230). Her approach calls for a "searching examination of the forms of 
labor and the relations of production" (p. 231 ). Like liberalism, how-
ever, Nussbaum's Aristotelianism is individualistic38 in that its chief 
focus is how to make each individual flourish. 
By contrast, William Sullivan proceeds from the premise that 
"[i]nstitutions are recognized patterns of interaction which define an 
order of mutual recognition in which individual identities are formed" 
(p. 155) to an antiindividualistic communitarian vision rooted in reli-
gious and republican traditions. Sullivan's communitarian vision em-
braces a public discourse focused on the common good: 
By requiring participants in the public argument to demonstrate how 
their proposals can enable all of us to live decently together, the idea of 
the common good offers a significant advantage over a discourse based 
upon individual rights advanced in abstraction from the defining goods 
of the political association. Over time, such a framework could help in-
dividuals and groups to reinterpret their interests in ways more condu-
cive to the discovery and forging of agreements. [p. 162] 
Sullivan's theme, albeit intelligently and originally presented, is by 
now all too familiar in the legal literature. 39 But even though familiar-
ity breeds a certain amount of contempt, and even though the decade 
of the eighties is behind us, the common good is still under-
emphasized. As I will ultimately argue, this country promotes passiv-
ity, selfishness, and greed at the expense of the critical, virtuous 
citizens whose development the contributors of the book advocate. 
Nonetheless, a liberal might fear that in Sullivan's regime - despite 
his best intentions - the drive for consensus might marginalize the 
dissenters and the different.40 Overall, however, my impression is that 
the contributors as a group forcefully demonstrate that there is a 
nontotalitarian world, a progressive world, beyond liberal neutrality 
- at least in "theory." · 
III. POLITICAL THEORY WITHOUT POLITICS 
A progressive world is not around the corner. Is this an objection? 
Of course not. But my objection is bolder. The worlds depicted in 
38. Nussbaum's approach is also communitarian: she believes affiliation and political partici-
pation with others is essential for "fully good human functioning." Pp. 233. In the form of 
communitarianism that Nussbaum espouses, individualism and communitarianism run together, 
not in opposition (as they do in much Aristotelian writing). 
39. I do not mean to suggest that Sullivan is a Johnny-come-lately to discussions about com-
munitarianism, republicanism, and public policy. In fact, some of Sullivan's best work in this 
area precedes the work of academic lawyers. See w. SULLIVAN, RECONSfRUCTING PUBLIC 
PHILOSOPHY (1982). 
40. For a response, see Alexander, Talking About Difference: Meanings and Metaphors of 
Individuality, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1355 (1990). 
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many of these essays are inconceivable. Moreover, steps to move to-
ward these worlds could be counterproductive. 
Reconsider Ackerman's world of liberal neutrality. I do not be-
lieve anyone among us thinks even for a moment that a political soci-
ety will ever banish conceptions of the good from political discourse. 
The theories of Rawls, Dworkin, and Ackerman are not merely con-
ceptual constructs, but political impossibilities.41 This in itself may 
not be objectionable. Sometimes utopian theory can serve as a regula-
tory ideal, something we want to move toward even though we know 
it will always be beyond our grasp. The small steps we take toward 
the goal may not be as large as we would like, but we are better off for 
having taken them. 
This, however, is not the case with the worlds of Rawls, Dworkin, 
or Ackerman. For liberals to press the theme of neutrality at the ex-
pense of their conception of the good is a form of "unilateral disarma-
ment" (Barry, p. 57). 
Although Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson in their contribu-
tion to Liberalism and the Good maintain that the proposal they put 
forth has "practical value" (p. 145), it ultirp.ately seems to be plagued 
with similar difficulties. Rightly, in my view, they believe that liberal 
neutrality does not permit enough room for debate and disagreement 
about moral issues in politics. Recognizing that consensus about the 
good is not achievable, they instead seek consensus about "the condi-
tions for political discussion of enduring moral disagreement" (p. 144). 
Essentially, they argue that citizens should treat each other with mu-
tual respect, an injunction that "requires a favorable attitude toward, 
and constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one dis-
agrees" (p. 134). Citizens who manifest mutual respect are open-
minded, prepared to find the good in their opponent's position, ready 
to compromise when it seems reasonable, and set to abandon an initial 
position when the opponents have made "unanswerable objections" (p. 
135). Gutmann and Thompson argue that the fostering of characters 
disposed toward mutual respect - which they characterize as a "dis-
tinctively democratic" character - would lead to both social good 
and individual virtue (p. 135). 
This proposal presents an interesting shift away from liberal neu-
trality. If we cannot base a liberal society, or build a consensus, by 
transcending conceptions of the good, perhaps we can agree about 
how we wjll disagree. Moreover, Gutmann and Thompson believe 
their perspective is not merely procedural because it would place many 
more moral issues on the public political agenda, and it would seek to 
41. Even if there were a political will to prohibit reference to the good in political discourse, 
consider the difficulties and implications associated with enforcement. Cf. K. GREENAWALT, 
supra note 28 (arguing that attempts to keep religion out of public life are for the most part ill· 
considered and naive). 
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promote a moral perspective, a citizenry that would look toward the 
common good, and ultimately, a public morality (p. 143). 
But surely no one, including Gutmann and Thompson, believes 
that a society of "mutual respecters" is ever going to be realized. The 
interesting question is whether or not we should consider it a regula-
tory ideal. Would it be socially valuable if everyone treated each other 
with mutual respect in political life? Put another way, suppose that 
most people treated each other according to the mandates of Dale 
Carnegie, 42 but that a substantial number of individuals with strong 
interests in the outcome of the process pressed their claims in the 
strongest of terms without any demonstrated interest in compromise. 
I would think that in the latter case the system would get the benefit of 
the strongest form of adversarial conflict, but would still be left with 
the capacity for accommodation and compromise. 43 If everyone exhib-
ited mutual respect, I envision an antiseptic faculty meeting in which 
hostile motives are disguised and the real arguments are made behind 
closed doors (or in a transparent public code) rather than in a genu-
inely open public discourse. This is not the intention of the Gutmann/ 
Thompson proposal, but I think it would be its real world existence, 
assuming even the possibility of its realization on a national political 
stage. 
Would it be desirable to encourage people to treat each other with 
mutual respect nonetheless? In general, why not? Yet one can at least 
question whether someone who, for instance, acts venally merits re-
spect.44 Moreover, in practice, an emphasis on mutual respect could, 
by tending toward compromise, bias the political process in a centrist 
direction, a result that is acceptable only if one thinks a centrist direc-
tion is desirable. 
Any emphasis on mutual respect would at least have to be accom-
panied by a concomitant encouragement of a citizenry prepared to 
challenge existing authorities, customs, habits, and traditions.45 Polit-
ical and social processes are already biased in directions that en-
courage conformity and that reward certain modes of being while 
placing others at the margin. As William Connolly puts it in his bril-
liant contribution to the collection: 
42. D. CARNEGIE, How TO WIN FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE (1936). 
43. This is an overall judgment. The system would work in some contexts, but not in others. 
44. Gutmann and Thompson state that their principles "govern the relations among citizens 
who hold morally legitimate though fundamentally opposed positions on public policy." P. 134. 
Gutmann and Thompson recognize that reasonable people can disagree about the question of 
what should count as a moral position especially in particular situations of conflict. Pp. 130-31. 
Nonetheless, they do not discuss the question of how much interpersonal respect is in order when 
opponents hold, or are perceived to hold, morally illegitimate positions or when opponents insin-
cerely profess a belief in morally legitimate positions or are perceived to do so. On many occa-
sions, such perceptions could occupy the field. 
45. See generally s. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 
(1990). 
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[T]he paradoxical element in the relation of identity to difference is that 
we need personal and collective identities to be, while the multiple drives 
to stamp truth upon the identities stamped upon us functions to convert 
difference into otherness and otherness into scapegoats created and 
maintained to secure the appearance of a true identity. To have a true 
identity is to be false to difference while to be true to difference is to 
sacrifice the drive to a true identity. [p. 61] 
Connolly seeks an alternative both to communitarianism and to 
liberal individualism because both tend to depoliticize political ar-
rangements and personal identity, by treating that which exists as 
"normal" or natural. According to Connolly, liberal individualism 
postulates a model of a rational or normal individual, and it encour-
ages a ''juridical conception of politics [that] tends to downplay the 
degree of politics, militance, and struggle required to establish space 
for individuality in a liberal society" (p. 73). 
Thus Connolly believes that a 
range of existing political settlements becomes politicized if a significant 
element of the populace credibly and insistently refuses to treat them as 
natural, thoroughly rational, reflective of a dialogic consensus or 
grounded in a higher direction and if another cluster of participants 
evinces agonistic respect for this orientation even while opposing it. [p. 
81] 
Connolly sees advantages to this approach over communitarianism 
whose underlying ontology must "receive a more consensual and se-
cure endorsement" (p. 81) than he thinks possible. Fair enough. 
Community cannot be achieved unless values are shared, and com-
munitarians are hard pressed to answer how humane values will come 
to be shared. But Connolly's account of militant dissent implies a sun-
nier approach to the problem of change than seems warranted. From 
his account it is unclear why those who seek to politicize existing set-
tlements would not be marginalized as kooks or scapegoats by the vast 
majority. 
Indeed, my chief criticism of Liberalism and the Good is that the 
essays (including Connolly's, albeit to a lesser extent than the others) 
fail to live up to what Ackerman sets out as the requirements of any 
"plausible political theory" (p. 30). Stating that he is interested in the 
realities of power (p. 43 n. 7), Ackerman maintains that theory needs 
to address the basic problems of political life and then present solu-
tions to them. For most of the contributors, the devil is a theory of 
liberalism that promotes alienated, materialist, selfish individuals. But 
even if the liberalism of John Rawls, Bruce Ackerman, and Ronald 
Dworkin were guilty of every sin laid out against it, that liberalism 
surely does not direct America. In a book in which contributor after 
contributor wants to promote a particular type of model citizen there 
is spectacular inattention to the forces in American society that pro-
mote particular conceptions of the good life. 
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One could focus on many aspects of American society. I will settle 
for a glimpse of one important slice. American television is organized 
as an advertising medium. An American child is exposed to literally 
hundreds of thousands of powerful commercials during the course of 
his or her upbringing.46 What commercials say to American adults 
and children many times an hour is that the acquisition of products is 
vitally important for human happiness and for a sense of identity. 
This commercial deluge surely has some impact. Daily exposure to 
televised commercialism seems to promote a hedonistic, acquisitive, 
materialistic, self-seeking, money-hungry culture and a privatized, 
nonengaged citizenry. 47 
Wholly apart from the advertisements themselves, corporate con-
trol of the mass media and the need to secure advertising revenues 
helps determine the character of the programs aired and the programs 
not aired, the news we hear and the news we do not hear.48 The print 
medium is also affected by the need to attract advertising revenue. It 
too presents a distorted image of human beings and a sanitized version 
of corporate products. 49 So too, corporate control of public spaces 
creates and reflects the image of the human being as shopper50 in an 
antiseptic world.51 In short, much of American society is structured 
to encourage52 the creation of citizens worthy of a corporate 
46. Comment, Unsafe for Little Ears? The Regulation of Broadcasting Advertising to Chil-
dren, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1131, 1136 n.27 (1978) (former chair of the FCC cited as calculating 
that average high school graduate would have seen 350,000 televised commercial messages, more 
than 21,000 per year). 
47. See generally s. EWEN, CAPTAINS OF CoNSCIOUSNESS: ADVERTISING AND THE SOCIAL 
ROOTS OF THE CONSUMER CULTURE (1976); C. LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM 72-74 
(1979); M. MILLER, BOXED IN: THE CULTURE OF TV 11-24, 49-50, 324-31 (1988); Benn, White 
Noise: The Long, Sad Story of TV Criticism, VOICE LITERARY SUPP., Dec. 1990, at 14; M. 
POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH (1985). But cf. J. FISKE, READING THE POPULAR 
(1989); J. FISKE, UNDERSTANDING POPULAR CULTURE 20-21 (1989) (exploring resistance and 
evasion to advertising and finding popular culture to be "potentially, and often actually, progres-
sive" but "accepting the power of the forces of dominance"; see also M. SCHUDSON, ADVERTIS-
ING, THE UNEASY PERSUASION: ITS DUBIOUS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY (1984) (critical 
of advertising in many respects, but stressing its limits). 
48. See, e.g., B. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (2d ed. 1987); D. KELLNER, TELEVI-
SION AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY (1990); Collins & Skover, The First Amendment in an Age 
of Paratroopers, 68 TEXAS L. REv. 1087, 1()98-1107 (1990). 
49. See, e.g., Steinem, Sex, Lies & Advertising, MS., July/ August 1990, at 18; Lee & Solo-
mon, The Buck Comes First, DISSENT, Fall 1990, at 525. 
50. Even if it were correct to say that humans are "natural" shoppers (homo shoppicus), 
which it is not - many hate to shop, though perhaps the rest are "naturals" - it is a big step to 
the conclusion that society should emphasize shopping to the degree American society does. 
51. See, e.g .• H. SCHILLER, CULTURE, INC.: THE CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF PUBLIC EX-
PRESSION 98-106 (1989); Morse, An Ontology of Everyday Distraction: The Freeway, the Mall, 
and Television, in LOGICS OF TELEVISION: EssAYS IN CULTURAL CRITICISM 193, 198-99 (P. 
Mellencamp ed. 1990). 
52. The role of corporate money and power in the political process contributes to the diffi-
culty of securing systematic political change. See, e.g., T. FERGUSON & J. ROGERS, RIGHT 
TURN: THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1986); 
Easterbrook, What's Wrong with Congress?, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 1984, at 57, 70-79; Green, 
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paradise. 53 
Not a single contributor to Liberalism and the Good regards the 
citizen of the corporate paradise as an ideal that a society should fos-
ter. Yet the issue of corporate power is not discussed in these essays. 
Perhaps the contributors are so attached to liberal theory that they 
cannot bring themselves to question the arrangements of our political 
economy. More likely, as I have suggested, their understanding of 
theory permits them to ignore too much of politics and practice. 
Whatever the cause, the essays are provocative and worth reading, but 
flawed. Politics, in general, and corporate power, in particular, cannot 
be ignored if any realistic assessment is to be made of the kind of citi-
zenry we want to promote and the forces that prevent us from doing 
so. 
Political Pac-Man, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 13, 1982, at 18; Stern, The Tin Cup Congress, 20 
_WASH. MONTHLY, May 1988, at 23. 
53. There are good reasons to reject state socialism as a form of political economy, but a 
capitalist system need not be a corporate paradise. For that matter, state socialism need not be 
the only form of socialism. See, e.g .• EssENTIAL WORKS OF SOCIALISM (I. Howe ed. 1976); M. 
HARRINGTON, THE NEXT LEFT (1986); 25 YEARS OF DISSENT: AN AMERICAN TRADmON (I. 
Howe ed. 1979). 
